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The last decade has seen the publication of many excellent 
books about neoliberalism that have challenged some of 
the glib stereotypes that attach themselves to the term. 
One of the most acclaimed has been William Davies’s 
2014 book The Limits of Neoliberalism, and justifiably so. 
The book has already been published in revised edition 
in 2017, with a new preface reassessing the argument 
in light of the Euro-American political dislocations of 
2016. A co-director of the Political Economy Research 
Centre at Goldsmiths, University of London, Davies has 
been a prolific author since the publication of the 2014 
edition, publishing two more books that have given him 
a readership well beyond the academy, and becoming 
a regular contributor to publications like The Guardian, 
London Review of Books, and The New York Times. The praise 
for The Limits of Neoliberalism has been near universal. The 
writer and journalist Paul Mason cited it in 2018 as one of 
the five books that best explain the condition of the Left 
today. According to Mason, it sums up the way in which 
the ‘modern left’ has come to think about neoliberalism, 
particularly the reinvigorated Left programme of the UK 
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Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn.1
Davies’s book is certainly replete with insights that resonate with Left 
analyses of neoliberalism. But one of its most striking features is how it 
breaks from a Left reflex that simply critiques neoliberalism, or, more 
reductively, approaches it as an ideology to be disparaged and censured. 
Davies reflects on this point in the introductory chapter. He expresses 
admiration for critical theoretical and sociological research that highlights 
the deeper structural underpinnings of neoliberal capitalism, but voices 
a concern that the normative and political force of such work—its ‘rush 
to explain or to criticize’—can obscure our interpretive understanding of 
neoliberalism as an object of analysis.2 Davies’s reservations about a one-
dimensional critique of neoliberalism are well-founded, not only because 
of the existence of a genre of Left analysis and commentary that rarely 
gets beyond denunciatory mode. It also invites us to think about how the 
gesture of critiquing the thing called ‘neoliberalism’ can become a banal 
rhetorical act, sufficiently nebulous in its political commitments that it is 
open to being affirmed by people that others might see as proponents of 
neoliberal order.  
Recall, for instance, the moment during the 2017 General Election 
campaign when Radio New Zealand’s Guyon Espiner asked Jacinda Ardern 
whether neoliberalism had failed. Ardern answered with a seemingly 
unequivocal ‘yes’, but her answers to Espiner’s follow-up question, ‘so 
what elements and aspects of the neoliberal agenda would you roll back?’, 
were far more uncertain and tentative.3 Espiner’s initial question cited an 
interview he did with former Prime Minister Jim Bolger earlier in 2017, 
where, unprompted, Bolger suggested that ‘neoliberal economic policies 
1 Paul Mason, ‘Five books to understand the left,’ The Guardian, 19 February 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/feb/19/paul-mason-five-books-to-
understand-the-left
2 William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of 
Competition (London: SAGE, 2017), 11.
3 Guyon Espiner, ‘The Leader Interview – Jacinda Ardern,’ Radio New Zealand, 
12 September 2017, https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/339209/the-leader-
interview-jacinda-ardern
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[had] failed’.4 However, when Espiner suggested that Bolger had ‘embarked 
on that model’ himself, Bolger immediately distanced neoliberalism from 
the ‘pragmatic policies’ of his own government. 
Both disavowals of neoliberalism are revealing: they position it as the 
name for a rigid and monolithic ideological identity that is opposed to 
Ardern and Bolger’s shared self-image of themselves as policy pragmatists. 
To invoke a concept often cited in the literature on neoliberalism, both 
obscure their own entanglement in an ideologically protean world of 
‘actually existing neoliberalism’, because of their internalisation of the 
erroneous assumption that, if it is to exist at all, neoliberalism must be 
expressed in some ‘pure’, doctrinal form.5 Davies is a useful guide in this 
respect, as he is alert to both the different articulations of neoliberal reason 
and its embodiment in social rituals and practices that assume the register 
of pragmatic policy commitments. In contrast to approaches that might 
interpret neoliberal justifications as offering little more than ideological 
camouflage, his book assumes that ‘the performative and critical power of 
neoliberal discourse needs to be taken seriously, as a basis on which crypto-
political and collective action does . . . take place’.6 
Davies defines neoliberalism as the ‘pursuit of the disenchantment of 
politics by economics’.7 The definition brilliantly captures how neoliberal 
identification with economic and market measures of value has always been 
animated by an ideological antipathy to the logic of politics, despite the 
fact, of course, that the institutionalisation of this vision needed to become 
a political project in its own right. In the preface to the revised edition, 
Davies contrasts this pithy definition with a more ‘cumbersome’ one in 
which neoliberalism is defined as ‘the elevation of market-based principles 
4 Guyon Espiner, ‘The Negotiator – Jim Bolger,’ Radio New Zealand, 21 April 
2017, https://www.radionz.co.nz/programmes/the-9th-floor/story/201840999/the-
negotiator-jim-bolger
5 Jamie Peck, Neil Brenner, and Nik Theodore, ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,’ in 
The Sage Handbook of Neoliberalism, ed. Damian Cahill, Melinda Cooper, and Martijn 
Konings (London: SAGE, 2018).
6 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 12.
7 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 6
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and techniques of evaluation to the level of state-endorsed norms’.8 This 
second definition is equally elegant in its rebuttal of hand-me-down 
notions that define neoliberalism through some rigid opposition between 
state and market. This dichotomy has never been a very helpful way of 
understanding the nature of neoliberal regimes, though it is often assumed 
in shorthand descriptions of neoliberalism as code for ‘free market’ and 
‘laissez faire’ ideology. For instance, in her extended answer to Espiner’s 
question about whether neoliberalism had failed, Ardern sought to distance 
herself from the term; she insisted ‘that New Zealand has been served 
well by interventionist governments’, contrasting her belief in a ‘more 
interventionist’ philosophy with an implicitly neoliberal one that ‘would 
allow the market to just dictate outcomes for people’.9 
To be fair, it is not surprising that the idea of state intervention in 
the economy is still construed as signifying opposition to neoliberalism in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, such was the intensity of the market fundamentalist 
assault on the social democratic state during the Rogernomics and 
Ruthanasia years.10 At the same time, though, banal rhetorical distinctions 
between state and market, intervention and non-intervention, hamper our 
ability to grasp the character of neoliberalism, and can cultivate the self-
serving impression among politicians—particularly in the Labour party—
that any statutory intervention in the economy constitutes a departure 
from some strict orthodoxy. As Foucault could already see in the 1970s, 
neoliberalism embodies an ‘intervening liberalism’ concerned with the 
project of reconstituting the state and its citizens as agents and objects of 
market calculation.11
While Foucault is one of many theoretical sources cited in the book, 
Davies’s approach is primarily informed by the so-called ‘convention 
theory’ and ‘pragmatic sociology’ tradition developed by the French 
8 The Limits of Neoliberalism, xiv
9 Espiner, ‘The Leader Interview – Jacinda Ardern’.
10 Brian Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1997).
11 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1978–1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 133.
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sociologist Luc Boltanski. As Davies summarises it, ‘the task of convention 
theory is to identify and illuminate the normative, technical and critical 
resources that are employed’ in the maintenance and justification of social 
order.12 This means critically excavating the social conventions and shared 
understandings that animate neoliberal policy regimes, interpretatively 
working through their ‘ways of thinking, measuring, evaluating, criticizing, 
judging and knowing’.13 It also means being alert to the performative 
contradictions that are generated when those conventions start to lose 
their normative force, and the limits of neoliberal authority become more 
publicly visible. 
Davies suggests ‘neoliberalism’s greatest dilemma’ concerns its 
relationship with ‘political sovereignty, in the sense of an ultimate source of 
political power or authority’.14 On the one hand, neoliberals are motivated 
by a desire ‘to replace politics with economics’, substituting the perceived 
arbitrariness and normativity of political judgements with regimes of 
‘objective’ scientific measurement. On the other hand, neoliberals cannot 
escape the inherently political underpinnings of their project and ‘their 
wish to place sovereignty on economically rational foundations’.15 Davies 
argues that the desire to install techniques of economic measurement as 
a foundational basis of social order is ultimately impossible, because ‘the 
discourse and techniques of economics are not self-justifying’; they always 
‘depend on silent, unseen sources of obligation, be they tacitly understood as 
norms of cooperation or tacitly understood as sources of political power’.16 
Davies isn’t a rhetorical theorist; however, his sensitivity to the rhetorical 
character of neoliberalism resonates with work highlighting how neoliberal 
identities are articulated through a ‘market realist’ and ‘economically 
correct’ rhetoric that crucially doesn’t see itself as rhetorical. Within the 
neoliberal worldview, ‘rhetoric’ (much like ideology) is seen as the attribute 
12 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 13.
13 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 14.
14 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 24.
15 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 25.
16 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 25.
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of the Other— the domain of those spouting metaphysical nonsense about 
politics.17 The neoliberal championing of economic measurement and 
empirical technique in opposition to politics and normativity are ultimately 
the basis of ‘rhetorical’ rather than ‘ontological’ distinctions, Davies argues, 
which obscure the value-laden character of any empirical description.18
One of the great strengths of Davies’s book is its attention to the 
internal heterogeneity of neoliberal thought and the different articulations 
of market rationality within a broader liberal philosophy (readers inclined 
to see the distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism as tautologous 
may be less enamoured). He highlights what he sees as a key historical 
shift in the genealogy of neoliberalism, which saw a principled ‘justification 
for markets’ mutate into an open-ended ‘justification for business’ that 
privileged the interests of transnational corporations.19 For the ordo-
liberal regime established in (West) Germany after World War Two, 
the institutionalisation of a market-order was primarily a constitutional 
question, focused on establishing a universal set of legal rules that would 
enable a competitive dynamic between different market players that curbed 
monopolistic tendencies. This folksy image of an idealised marketplace, 
premised on some notion of an equal playing field, later morphed into 
the legitimation of a quite distinct doctrine of ‘market competitiveness’. 
This was mediated by the ascendency of neoclassical and Chicago School 
economic theories that fretted less about the exact composition of markets, 
so long as the allocation of economic resources could be deemed more 
‘efficient’ by the objective evaluations of an increasingly powerful class of 
economist-experts. Neoliberal reason became progressively embedded in 
a straightforward justification of capitalist power, exemplified for Davies 
in the figure of ‘the heroic, creative entrepreneur’ eulogised for their 
capacity to conquer and dominate market rivals.20 Instead of a ‘formal-
17 James Arnt Aune, Selling the Free Market: The Rhetoric of Economic Correctness 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 2001); see also, Sean Phelan, Neoliberalism, Media and 
the Political (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
18 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 17.
19 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 50.
20 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 51.
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structural emphasis on competition as an essential property of markets’, 
‘competitiveness’ was recast in psychological terms as an essential trait of 
individuals, opening the way for a now familiar world where the tools of 
‘neoliberal critique’ and audit were deployed to highlight the competitive 
deficiencies of institutional practices beyond a strictly commercial domain.21 
Chapter three focuses most explicitly on the Chicago School and 
documents the importance of the so-called ‘law and economics movement’ 
to the institutionalisation of neoliberal imperatives.22 The importance of 
law to the establishment of market order was already clearly grasped by the 
ordo-liberals in the 1940s. It was also a central concern of the work of the 
most important neoliberal theorist, Friedrich Hayek. But the interplay of 
economic and legal imperatives was given distinct ideological expression 
in a Chicago School doctrine that sought to colonise legal judgments 
with neoclassical economic assumptions and disparage any contrary 
‘metaphysical’ arguments ‘about what a market or economy “ought” to look 
like’.23 Aided by the emergence of a network of ‘Chicago-influenced judges 
and economists in the courtroom, and by economists within anti-trust 
agencies themselves’, this intellectual project was remarkably successful in 
overturning anti-trust laws in the US during the 1970s and 1980s.24 Its 
influence was also discernible in a pattern of competition law judgements 
by the New Zealand Commerce Commission that was similarly agnostic 
about monopolistic or duopolistic practices, so long as there were no formal 
barriers to the possibility of future competition.25 ‘The question of “just or 
unjust” was displaced by one of “efficient or inefficient”’, and economists’ 
power to determine what constituted relevant evidence assumed a ‘quasi-
judicial’ status.26 The strategic ‘intentions, practices and norms’ of situated 
21 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 21, 51.
22 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 87.
23 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 85.
24 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 96.
25 Nathan Strong, Alan Bollard, and Michael Pickford, ‘Defining Market 
Dominance: A Study of Antitrust Decisions on Business Acquisitions in New 
Zealand,’ Review of Industrial Organization 17, no. 2 (2000): 209–227.
26 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 76–77.
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market actors were ignored ‘in favour of measured effects as calculated 
by economists’.27 In a world where the motivations of all other social 
actors were diagnosed and explained through the self-interested axioms of 
neoclassical economics and rational choice theory, economists assumed the 
authority of ‘disinterested’ and ‘objective’ experts with the analytical clarity 
to see through the spurious ‘moral reasoning’ and bullshit of others.28
Any assessment of neoliberalism in our current political moment means 
thinking about its relationship with nationalism. Taking his cue from 
David Harvey’s observation that ‘the neoliberal state needs nationalism 
of a certain sort to survive’, Davies’s examination of the discourse of 
national competitiveness in chapter four had not yet anticipated the 
recent reinvigoration of the far-right.29 But his analysis of the antagonistic 
dynamics between different nation-states competing on a global stage 
now reads as a prescient discussion of the emergence of a more aggressive 
form of ‘neoliberal nationalism’ ‘in which rules are only recognised to 
the extent that they offer a strategic local advantage’.30 He argues that a 
tamed version of Carl Schmitt’s stark existential conception of politics as a 
domain of ‘friend–enemy’ conflicts was institutionalised in a ‘new type of 
political-economic contest’; this lay between some mythical liberal utopia 
where market competition benefits everyone and a ‘zero sum geopolitical 
contestation between states’ now visible in the ‘America first’ impulses of 
the Trump administration.31 
Under the regime of ‘neoliberal internationalism’ described by Davies, 
the management of a nation-state’s competitive standing vis-à-vis other 
nations has come to be regarded as the core function of government.32 
The project of ‘branding’ the nation to render it more attractive to the 
27 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 95.
28 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 101.
29 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 119.
30 Adam Harmes, ‘The Rise of Neoliberal Nationalism,’ Review of International 
Political Economy 19, no. 1 (2012): 59–86; The Limits of Neoliberalism, 157.
31 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 131–132.
32 Harmes, ‘The Rise of Neoliberal Nationalism.’
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imperatives of global and domestic capital becomes part of an (anti-)political 
common-sense that dissolves distinctions between politics, business, and 
marketing, and invites ridicule of any political programme seen as threating 
the strategic objective of national competitiveness. Davies’s discussion of 
how ‘executive authority’ was reinvented under neoliberalism will summon 
plenty of associations for New Zealand readers: the dull ‘capitalist realism’ 
of the Key years for starters, though we can also recall the heightened 
attention to cultural identity as a source of global market differentiation 
under the Labour-led governments of Helen Clark.33 Davies’s analysis also 
invites reflection on how governmental authority was reconstituted in a 
variety of institutional settings, where the fixation with mimicking business 
practices and techniques changed the fundamental culture of different 
organisational domains. 
Davies’s argument about the performative limits and failures of 
neoliberalism crystallises in chapter five where he examines how neoliberal 
regimes responded to the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Davies argues that this widely narrated neoliberal crisis has spawned a 
regime of ‘contingent neoliberalism’. This regime is ‘in a literal sense 
unjustified’, because it signifies a world where the authority of neoliberal 
reason can no longer convincingly claim to rest simply on technocratic and 
putatively apolitical commitments.34 The bailout of the banking system 
publicly dramatised the foundational paradox and amnesia at the heart of 
the neoliberal project: that ‘its conditions of possibility’ were dependent 
on the sovereignty of the state and a realm of ‘political metaphysics’ that 
neoliberals sought to replace with a purely economised conception of 
statehood.35 With the notion that economic methodologies might serve 
as a ‘transcendental principle’ of social order seemingly fatally damaged, 
neoliberal justifications have become zombie-like, appealing to ‘forms of 
conduct’ and ‘representations of reality’ increasingly denuded of public 
33 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 117; Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism (London: Zero 
Books, 2009).
34 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 189.
35 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 161.
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legitimacy.36 And yet, the aftermath of the GFC belied claims about the 
‘death’ of neoliberalism and saw the emergence of new forms of state 
intervention that aimed to recuperate neoliberal order through appeals to 
austerity. In the preface to the revised edition, Davies suggests the political 
‘eruptions of 2016 . . . represented the long-awaited politicisation and 
publicisation of a crisis that, until then, had been largely dealt with by the 
same cadre of experts whose errors had caused it in the first place’.37
Although written before Trump’s election as president, the revised 
preface poses the question of whether neoliberalism is ‘dead or alive’ in 
light of political events such as Brexit that have challenged some of the 
core assumptions of the original book.38 If neoliberalism can be defined as 
the ‘disenchantment of politics by economics’, Davies suggests that Brexit 
symbolises ‘the revenge of politics on economics’.39 Those campaigning in 
favour of the UK’s ongoing membership in the EU thought that citing 
the authority of a gallery of economists, technocrats, elite politicians, and 
corporate leaders would be sufficient to ensure a winning vote. Instead, the 
referendum result captured a public mood increasingly sceptical of expertise, 
as (in)famously captured in Tory minister Michael Gove’s assertion during 
a televised campaign debate that ‘I think the people in this country have 
had enough of experts [from] organisations [with] acronyms saying that 
they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong’.40
If our understanding of neoliberalism is necessarily tied to the 
epistemological and cultural authority of a regime of technocratic 
expertise, the turbulent politics of 2016 may well be taken as evidence 
that the zombie has finally been killed off, with even economists from the 
36 The Limits of Neoliberalism, 155–156.
37 The Limits of Neoliberalism, xv.
38 The Limits of Neoliberalism, xviii.
39 The Limits of Neoliberalism, xiv.
40 Fraser Nelson, ‘Michael Gove was (accidentally) right about experts,’ The 
Spectator, 14 January 2017, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/michael-gove-was-
accidentally-right-about-experts/
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International Monetary Fund now lining up to critique ‘neoliberalism’.41 
Yet, the matter is not as simple as that, and to think otherwise is to fall 
into the analytical trap of defining neoliberal reason in rigid mechanistic 
terms that obscure its capacity for very different kinds of political and 
ideological articulations. For instance, neither of the two major dislocatory 
political events of 2016 (the Brexit vote and Trump’s election) constituted 
a blanket disavowal of neoliberalism, even if both entailed the rejection 
of particular neoliberal regimes. Nancy Fraser suggests Trump’s election 
victory symbolised the defeat of ‘progressive neoliberalism’, an alliance 
of mainstream feminist, anti-racist, multicultural, and LGBTQ+ social 
movements on the one side and Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood 
corporate interests on the other.42 Trump has ruled through a regime of 
‘hyperreactionary neoliberalism’ which dramatises the potential affinities 
between neoliberal and far-right ideologies. If disenchantment with politics 
is a hallmark of neoliberal reason, Trump surely represents one of the most 
vivid expressions yet of an anti-political mood where ‘not being a politician’ 
becomes an electoral asset. The Brexit vote likewise signified a rejection 
of neoliberalism, at least if we accept Left representations of the EU as a 
quintessential neoliberal institution. However, the Brexiters’ hyperglobalist 
vision of a post-EU UK, a UK liberated from what they depict as a 
crypto-socialist EU, hardly represents a departure from a neoliberal script. 
Highlighting these contradictions should not be construed as suggesting 
that neoliberalism is somehow the only concept we need to analyse 
everything signified by Trump and Brexit. However, it is to encourage 
pause before we once again declare its death.  
And what of neoliberalism in contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand? 
Ardern’s disavowal may summon clearer questions than answers, but her 
official rejection of neoliberalism amounts to a very predictable rhetorical 
gesture from someone who knows that identifying with neoliberalism is 
41 Jonathan Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: 
Oversold?’ Finance & Development 53, no. 2 (2016): 38–41.
42 Nancy Fraser, ‘From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond,’ 
American Affairs 1, no. 4 (2017). Available at https://americanaffairsjournal.
org/2017/11/progressive-neoliberalism-trump-beyond/
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not the wisest way to ‘rebrand’ the Labour Party. In that respect, Ardern is 
simply following the lead of her political mentor Helen Clark who straddled 
a similarly awkward line of rejecting some notionally pure neoliberalism 
while concurrently affirming a ‘Third Way’ vision that became a byword for 
further neoliberalisation. To its champions from afar Ardern’s government 
now distinguishes itself on the global stage as the embodiment of a 
progressive centre in a political atmosphere where the centre no longer 
holds. But in the reinvigorated Left universe symbolised by Jeremy Corbyn 
and Bernie Sanders, ‘centrist’ has become a default pejorative for critiquing 
the limits and vacuity of a liberal politics that continues to deny its own 
neoliberal underpinnings.
Whether Ardern’s rhetorical commitments find a meaningful political 
footing can—if we are kind—be read as a still open question, though the 
evidence so far hardly amounts to much. The recent abandonment of the 
government’s plans to introduce a capital gains tax symbolised an elite 
political culture still disenchanted with politics. Ardern’s renunciation of 
the policy on the grounds that New Zealanders ‘don’t believe in it’ exhibited 
her own affinities with the post-politics of John Key: public opinion is 
seen as a dull, static thing to be focus-grouped and polled, rather than 
something that needs to be politically made and animated beyond the 
back-stage machinations of the MMP system.43 Her government’s strategy 
seemed to rest on a magical decoupling of policy prescription from the 
actual politics—as if the outsourced recommendations of the Tax Working 
Group would be enough to sway the argument and somehow forgo the 
need for rhetorical combat with the right-wing interests that set the terms 
of the public and media conversation in the days after the release of the 
working group’s report.
I write at a time when the second budget of Ardern’s government is 
four weeks away, so we can at least hope that there might be something on 
the horizon that belies the impression of post-political stasis. However, in 
43 Peter Malcom, ‘Dropping the capital gains tax lets selfishness and greed win,’ 
Stuff, 18 April 2019, https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/opinion-analysis/112122449/
selfishness-and-greed-are-not-the-kiwi-way 
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the spirit of Davies’s book, perhaps we might be able to formulate a clearer 
diagnosis of the condition of neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand today 
if we think less about the official ideological declarations of politicians and 
focus more on the condition of a public institution familiar to many of 
the readers of Counterfutures: the New Zealand university. In the most 
reactionary version of today’s culture wars, the university is depicted as a 
hub of radical left-wing ideologues—‘cultural Marxists’ hell-bent on the 
indoctrination of students. This caricature is stupid for lots of reasons, but 
it is especially laughable as a description of an institutional universe where 
neoliberal determinations of efficiency seem, if anything, to be consolidating 
their authority among the managerial elite that run the corporate 
university. Evidence easily recorded and quantified on spreadsheets—
enrolment numbers, research income, research audit scores, salary-student 
ratios, research outputs, global rankings, citation scores, contract hours, 
marking time, learning objectives, learning outcomes—have become the 
primary bureaucratic mediums for determining who or what is valued. 
Disenchantment with politics and normative questions finds expression 
in a managerial sensibility that has little time for the kinds of ideas and 
arguments circulating in the work of the ‘clandestine university’, unless 
they can be deployed to flatter the corporate brand. Academics (or at least 
many of us) submit to our own kind of ‘there is no alternative’ passivity, 
our grumbling largely confined to lunchtime snark and journal articles that 
critique neoliberalism.44 The possibility of a meaningful collective pushback 
feels remote, despite affirmative developments elsewhere; perhaps, we hope, 
a sign of things to come.45
Unless we challenge the forms of neoliberal reason that still hold 
practical authority in different institutional contexts in Aotearoa New 
Zealand and elsewhere—in our universities, in our public service, in our 
media system, and in our conception of (political) economy—ruminating 
44 Thomas Docherty, ‘Unseen Academy,’ Times Higher Education, 10 November 
2011, http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=418076
45 James Williams, ‘The “clandestine university” is clandestine no more,’ Prospect, 29 
March 2018, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/the-clandestine-university-
is-clandestine-no-more
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on whether neoliberalism is dead or alive risks becoming a quasi-theological 
question. Davies’s book, exquisitely written and brimming with insights, 
offers a superb resource for grasping these connections. What we make of 
them is, as ever, up to us.
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